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Keeping the Account Open:
On Metaphysical Mistrust in Transpersonal Psychology
(A Response to Hartelius, 2017)
Steve Taylor

Leeds Beckett University
Leeds, UK
In response to Hartelius (2017), I suggest that the evidence for perennialism or essentialism can
be tested, and is publicly accessible, through engagement with the spiritual practices that have
given rise to cross-cultural mystical experiences with common characteristics. This suggests that
essentialism could be included in transpersonal psychology (and psychology in general). I suggest
that there is no reason why transpersonal psychology should exclude metaphysical claims, as long
as they are inferred or implied by research and evidence, explicitly stated and viewed as secondary.
It is impossible to avoid metaphysics, and it is important for transpersonal psychologists (and all
psychologists and scientists in general) to be explicit about their metaphysical assumptions.

I
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am grateful for the extensive response Hartelius
(2017) has made to my essay, “The Return of Perennial
Perspectives? Why Transpersonal Psychology Should
Remain Open to Essentialism” (Taylor, 2017a). This
ongoing dialogue has stimulated me to further develop
and clarify my ideas and to conduct further research in
these areas.
In this response, I further defend the view
that there is no reason why transpersonal psychologists
should refrain from stating metaphysical positions, so
long as these are secondary, and are inferred or implied
by phenomenological evidence and with more research
proposed to test a hypothesis. It is artificial to attempt to
refrain from making metaphysical claims, and important
not to conceive of science as an objective, non-metaphysical
domain that only includes phenomena or concepts that can
be falsified.
In any case, it may not be valid to assume that
the evidence for perennialism or essentialism cannot be
tested, and is not publicly accessible. It can be tested, and
is accessible to investigation, through engagement with
the spiritual practices that have given rise to cross-cultural
mystical experiences with common characteristics. It may
therefore be unreasonable to exclude essentialism from
transpersonal psychology (and psychology in general).
In these terms, perennialism does not necessarily lie
outside science and psychology, and soft perennialism
should not be seen as a New Age religion (as Hartelius
has suggested).

One of the traditional aims of transpersonal
psychology is to explore the farther reaches of human
nature, expansive areas of potential human experience that
are obscure, and may be diﬃcult to frame linguistically or
conceptually (such as mystical experiences in which one
experiences a sense of oneness with the world). To view
these areas as metaphysical and attempt to exclude them
is possibly therefore contrary to the historical principles
of the field. In this response, I will also describe why I
disagree with Hartelius’ comparison of soft perennialism
to creationism and intelligent design.
The Perennial Perspective
he main aim of Taylor (2017a) was to make a strong
defense of the perennial perspective. A case was
made that there is ample evidence for a common core
of essential characteristics of awakening experiences (as
explorations and interpretations of the same expansive
landscape of potential human experience). As a result,
it was argued that an experiential perennialist (or
essentialist) outlook is valid and necessary. At the same
time it was shown that other potential arguments to
account for these commonalities—such as cultural
transmission and neurology—are weak.
Hartelius (2017) has remarked that “Whether
or not a handful of contemporary academics support
perennialist or essentialist positions does not make
soft perennialism more critically sound” (p. 104).
However, there is a little more to it than this. For
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example, as suggested in Taylor (2017a), some of the
most convincing evidence of a perennial experiential
landscape comes from cross-cultural studies using
Hood’s quantitative measure, the M-Scale. These studies
have shown that the same characteristics occur across
different traditions, as well as outside those traditions.
In addition, academics such as Studstill (2005) and
Rose (2016) have made extremely detailed comparative
investigations of contemplative traditions, which may
not be easily refuted. It is also important to remember
that these scholars’ arguments in favor of perennialism
is just one aspect of the overall case. For example, in
my previous response, evidence was presented from
near-death experiences, reports of post-traumatic
growth (or post-traumatic transformation) and from
individuals who were naturally awakened without being
familiar with spiritual traditions. Arguments against the
contextualist theory of mystical experiences were also
put forward.
I appreciate it may not be possible for Hartelius
to respond to every point I made in my previous response,
but let me repeat my argument that previous critiques of
perennialism (Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013; Hartelius, 2015)
largely only dealt with a straw man of traditional hard
perennialism, without looking at some more nuanced
theories from contemporary scholars. Hartelius again
argues that it is problematic that spiritual traditions
describe non-ordinary experiences inconsistently, but
his discussion of spiritual diversity needs to account
for two different issues. First, there is the distinction
between popular religion and the contemplative
traditions that may be associated with them, such as
between popular Christianity and Christian mysticism,
between conventional Islam and Sufism, or between
popular Hinduism and Yoga or Vedanta. Schuon
(1984) framed this as a distinction between exoteric and
esoteric traditions. Wilber (2000) has made a similar
distinction between conventional translative religion
and transformative contemplative traditions. In Taylor
(2017b) the same distinction has been described in terms
of conventional religion which consoles and compensates
the ego, and mystical traditions that encourage one to
transcend the ego. Obviously, these distinctions are
not cut and dried, but it is important to take them
into account, since scholars of religion generally agree
that the greatest diversity is found within exoteric
or conventional religions, whereas the contemplative
traditions have much greater commonalities.
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The second issue that is relevant to Hartelius'
discussion of spirituality diversity is that—as pointed
out in Taylor (2017a)—diversity is much reduced in
phenomenological descriptions of mystical experience
(particularly those that occur outside the context specific
spiritual traditions) compared to teachings or conceptual
frameworks (Marshall, 2005). Scholars such as Forman
(1999) and Marshall (2005) have suggested that Katz
(1978) has made the error of comparing teachings
rather than actual accounts of mystical experiences.
Narratives and beliefs may be significantly diverse; and
the experiences and practices associated with popular or
exoteric religion may be diverse; but there is significantly
more commonality in the experiences and practices
associated with contemplative traditions.
Explanations and Correlations
n Taylor (2017a) I described the attempt to account for
mystical experiences in neurological factors as a form
of neuroscientific reductionism. Three problematic areas
were highlighted: the hard problem of explaining any
conscious experience in terms of neurological factors,
the lack of direct and reliable correspondence between
mental and neural activity, and anomalous experiences
such as NDEs and terminal lucidity, which suggest
that consciousness is to some degree independent of the
brain. Hartelius (2017a) has responded to this with an
argument in favor of correlations between mental events
and neural activity, stating that my approach involves
“rejecting suggestions that the shared biological heritage
of the human family might be in any way correlated
with similarities in what he has identified as awakening
experiences across a variety of religious and secular
contexts; his concern is that these might constitute
neuroscientific reductionism” (p. 102).
However, in Taylor (2017a) I did not argue
against a correlation but against an explanation. In
this context, correlations do not denote neuroscientific
reductionism, but explanations do. It is true that I have
suggested, in a more general sense, that “neuroscience
has yet to establish any reliable and consistent
correspondence between specific mental states and
specific patterns of neurological activity, which we would
expect if the latter produced the former” (Taylor, 2017a,
p. 80). But a reliable and consistent correspondence is
a different matter from a correlation. It seems perfectly
logical to assume that there may be associations
between awakening experiences and certain patterns
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of neurological activity, and with certain physiological
changes, but this is not to say that they are reliable or
consistent, or generalizable. I do not reject the possibility
of neurological correlations. I simply argue that—at least
as yet—there is no evidence of causation.
In Hartelius (2017a) some examples of
correlations between states of consciousness and
neurology and physiology have been provided, to justify
the argument that “a neurobiological theory greatly
reduces any urgent need for explanation by some form of
perennialism, and is considerably more parsimonious” (p.
102). However, the neurological theories that have been
put forward so far (such as Persinger, 1983, or Newberg
& D’Aquilli, 2000) have proven woefully inadequate
(Marshall, 2005; Kelly & Grosso, 2007; Aaen-Stockdale,
2012). It is possible that a much more satisfactory theory
may emerge in the future, but these previous efforts do
not inspire confidence. Any such theory would also have
to surmount the “hard problem.”
Hartelius (2017a) has gone to great lengths to
defend reductionism in general, stating that “the mere
fact that a process involves some reduction should not
make it immediately suspect” (p. 102). I completely agree
with this. Reductionism is often useful, and sometimes
necessary, such as when, in Hartelius' (2017a) words,
“explanatory reduction enables complex information to
be grasped in terms of salient features; even language
entails reducing many unique phenomena to a single
category such as dog or door” (p. 102). However, my
argument was not against reductionism in general, only
against neuroscientific reductionism. The argument is
only that reductionism has not proven up to the task of
explaining spiritual or mystical experiences.
Metaphysical Mistrust
artelius’ (2017a) position is that “perennialism is
a metaphysical philosophy of spirituality whereas
psychology is an empirical study of the human mind
and its expression” (p. 79). In other words, perennialism
has no place in psychology. However, simply deeming
perennialism to be metaphysical does not invalidate
it. If the evidence for it is convincing, and cannot be
adequately refuted, then it should be included within
the parameters of psychology, rather than excluded on
ideological grounds.
One could compare this to how a scientist might
react to evidence for psychic phenomena. Imagine a
tightly controlled, methodologically sound experiment

that shows a statistically significant effect for telepathy
or precognition. Ideally, a scientist would carefully
review the study, and if he or she deemed it convincing,
cautiously accept that there appears to be evidence of
an unexplained phenomenon. However, past examples
indicate that this ideal scenario does not often occur.
For example, in (2011) Bem published a paper called
“Feeling the Future” in the Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, detailing the results of 9 experiments
involving more than 1000 participants, eight of which
showed significant statistical evidence for precognition
and premonition. However, prominent skeptics were
outraged, and dismissed Bem’s findings out of hand. For
example, Hyman described the results, as"pure craziness
... an embarrassment for the entire field” (in Carr, 2011,
p. 2). In other words, skeptics were unwilling to consider
the evidence on ideological grounds.
In some respects, Hartelius' position is quite
simple and logical: science does not deal with metaphysics;
transpersonal psychology should strive to be a science,
and therefore should be free of metaphysics. In his view,
soft perennialism is a metaphysical claim and should
not therefore be presented as a psychological theory. The
subtitle of my recent book (The Psychology of Spiritual
Awakening [Taylor, 2017b]) is therefore misleading,
since it does not actually discuss psychology (although
note that the soft perennialist model is not presented in
this book, nor in any other of my popular books. Indeed,
I have not discussed transpersonal psychology directly in
any of my books.)
However, the relationship between metaphysics
and science may be more complicated and nuanced
than this. Science and metaphysics (and by association
religion) are not discrete and independent areas.
Hartelius has an intense faith in the (relative) objectivity
and reliability of science and a correspondingly jaundiced
attitude to metaphysics. In his view, soft perennialism
fits neatly into the category of metaphysics, whereas
psychology (and the kind of transpersonal psychology
advocated by Hartelius) fits into the category of science.
First of all, one may consider the contention
that perennialism lies outside science and psychology,
and therefore belongs to the category of religion. I agree
with Hartelius' (2017) statement that psychological
ideas should not be “metaphysical in the sense that
they appeal to causes on the basis of authority or
tradition rather than evidence of the sort anyone
could examine for themselves if they took the trouble
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to do so. Explanations based on causes for which
there likely can be no direct evidence are more typical
of religious knowledge” (p. 93). However, I do not
believe that this applies to soft perennialism. I think
that it is possible to find direct evidence—or public
evidence—for essentialism. For example, consider the
case that has been made for essential aspects of mystical
experience by scholars such as Studstill (2005) and
Rose (2016), and the evidence for these accumulated
by cross-cultural studies using Hood’s M-scale. This
is evidence that certainly can be examined by anyone
who is prepared to follow the transformative practices
and processes discussed by Studstill (2005; specifically,
those of Dzogchen and medieval German mystics such
as Meister Eckhart, Suso and Tauler) or by Rose (2016;
specifically, those of Theravada Buddhism, Patañjalian
Yoga, and Catholic mystical theology). In the same way,
anyone is free to “test” the evidence of the cross-cultural
studies of the M-Scale by engaging with diverse spiritual
practices, and ascertaining whether they develop the
characteristics highlighted by the scale.
In this sense, the evidence for essentialism can
be examined. Therefore, in accordance with Hartelius'
own definition, it is not a metaphysical claim. One
certainly does not just have to accept essentialism
based on tradition and authority, as Hartelius (2017)
has suggested. That may be true of some facets of
conventional or exoteric religion, but not in relation
to contemplative traditions that emphasize direct,
first-hand experience and verification for oneself. This
form of phenomenological perennialism does therefore
belong within the remit of psychology. In consequence,
it is not a New Age religion.
An argument against the above point might
be that the common core of mystical experiences—
or what I have described as a landscape of expansive
potential human experience (Taylor, 2016, 2017)—is
not immediately and directly available to everyone. This
is probably true, but to dismiss the common core theory
on these grounds would be illogical, like deciding that
there is no evidence for a landscape’s existence because
only a small proportion of the population have travelled
there and explored it. It is also an attitude that privileges
ordinary consciousness (a state in which human beings
do not generally have ready access to the common
core characteristics) over other modes. Traditionally,
transpersonal and spiritual attitudes have held that
everyday awareness is limited to some degree, and that

certain practices and paths allow cultivation of a more
expansive awareness, opening one up to wider and
deeper realities. So to disregard these wider and deeper
realities because they are not immediately accessible
could be construed as contravening the traditional
principles of transpersonal psychology, and of spiritual
traditions in general.
Since the landscape of expansive potential
human experience is accessible—even if not readily
so—and so can be directly experienced, it does
potentially conform to James’s (1904) concept of
radical empiricism. If it is metaphysical in the sense
Hartelius (2017) has used the term (in the sense of not
being immediately and directly accessible) this is only
in relation to ordinary consciousness—the ordinary
consciousness that, according to the principles of
spiritual traditions, is limited, and should be expanded
and intensified.
On a more general point, I believe that
Hartelius (2017) has too readily associated metaphysical
claims with religion. Because I have made metaphysical
claims (Taylor, 2017) he has accused me of propagating
a New Age religion. But while religion certainly does
include metaphysical claims, religion and metaphysics
are not synonymous. One does not become religious as
soon as one makes a metaphysical claim. In practice,
metaphysical claims are often made outside the domain
of religion—as will presently become clear, when
the relationship between science and metaphysics is
discussed. (As noted above, the fact that perennialism
can be placed within the remit of psychology also
suggests that it is not a New Age religion.)
Soft perennialism is a provocative theory
suggested by a range of evidence from various sources,
including mystical texts, anthropological reports of
indigenous cultures, and reports of spiritual experiences
or other transformative experiences. It is not a wholly
abstract or conceptual (or religious) metaphysical claim,
but one that I believe is to some extent empirical. Note
that I use the term suggested rather than proven. I agree
that the theory is speculative. But I think there is a
valid case to be made for it, which merits serious debate.
And the best way of refuting soft perennialism is not
to dismiss it as metaphysical, but to engage with the
evidence, and examine whether it supports the claim.
If there was a good case for refuting my interpretation
of the evidence then I would, of course, be willing to
revise my views.
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Science and Metaphysics
artelius (2017) has restated that concepts can
be deemed metaphysical (and hence in his view
nonscientific) if they “cannot be independently verified
or falsified” (p. 99). However, this ignores the issue of
whether it is invalid and outmoded to use falsification
and verification as criteria to distinguish between science
and metaphysics (Taylor, 2017a). Most contemporary
philosophers of science recognize that it is “far too
simplistic to make a distinction between falsifiable
science and unfalsifiable metaphysics” (Taylor, 2017a, p.
83). Most theories gain credence through accumulating
evidence over a long period of time—that is, through
confirmation rather than falsification (Kelly, 2015;
Chalmers, 1979). If one thinks in terms of confirmation
rather than falsification, and in terms of the importance
of accumulating evidence, one could envisage how
psychic phenomena such as telepathy or precognition
could eventually be deemed scientifically valid, by way
of successful trials and replicated results. The same could
be true of perennialism, or essentialism. If sufficient
evidence is deemed to have been accumulated via studies
such as those using Hood’s M-Scale and other forms of
quantitative and qualitative research, there is no reason
why the concept should not be seen as scientifically valid.
The issue here is testing. It must be seen if, over
time, the evidence supports soft perennialism or does not.
It is surely good scientific practice to allow a hypothesis
the opportunity to establish itself. Again, note that I am
not promoting soft perennialism as a proven psychological
theory, only as a hypothesis which can be further
investigated.
The same is true of the claim of an allpervading spiritual force. Even this—which I admit is
a metaphysical step beyond essentialism itself, and even
more of a speculation, but one that is still suggested by
some evidence—could become a scientifically acceptable
concept if it were supported by enough evidence. At
any rate, the claim could be refined by more detailed
investigation of the data—or alternatively, become refuted
if a good case were made against it.
I suspect that part of the issue here may be my use
of the term “spiritual force.” It may be that if I had used
a more neutral term such as “consciousness” (Chalmers,
1996) or “field of awareness” (Forman, 1998, p. 185) then
this claim would not have been deemed so controversial
by Hartelius. (Indeed, as will be seen shortly, Hartelius,

2015, has himself made a very similar claim while using
the term consciousness.)
Another relevant issue here is the metaphysical
basis of science. While in Taylor (2017a) it was argued that
science may be strongly underpinned by metaphysical
concepts, Hartelius (2017) has argued that there is
a question of degree here, and that the metaphysical
underpinnings of science are likely to be much less
significant than those of religion. He has spoken of “the
unavoidable presence of some metaphysical assumptions”
but has suggested that this is not equivalent to creating
systems that “rely substantively and uncritically on
grand universal assumptions that are untestable by any
empirical means” (Hartelius, 2017, p. 103, italics in
original).
I agree with Hartelius that there are degrees
of uncritical acceptance of assumptions and that
some metaphysical systems may be more informed
by these. In practice, however, science often does
include grand theories and scientists are often prone to
making metaphysical statements. Science is frequently
underpinned by scientism—that is, the belief system
of scientific materialism (Sheldrake, 2012). Materialist
monism is surely a grand theory, insisting that matter
is the primary reality, and including assumptions
that consciousness is produced by the brain, and that
evolution can be explained solely in terms of random
mutations and natural selection. Whilst they are derived
from some scientific findings, these are assumptions that
cannot be tested or proven. How would it be possible
to prove that consciousness is produced by the brain,
or that consciousness ends with the death of the body?
In other words, there is not necessarily evidence of false
equivalence here.
Frequently, adherents of materialist monism
make metaphysical statements, while believing that
they are speaking from a basis of scientific objectivity.
One example of this is Francis Crick’s “astonishing
hypothesis” that “You, your joys and your sorrows,
your memories and your ambitions, your sense of
personal identity and free will, are in fact no more
than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and
their associated molecules” (Crick, 1994, p. 3). The
evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins has waxed
metaphysical throughout his books—for example, when
he has described human beings as “lumbering robots”
and “survival machines,” nothing more than vehicles for
genes whose “preservation is the ultimate rationale for

Metaphysical Mistrust and Ideology in Transpersonal

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 115

H

our existence” (Dawkins, 1976, p. 21). Another example
is the psychologist Nicholas Humphrey’s assertion that
“materialism is to all intents and purposes the fact of
life” (1995, p. 54).
I agree with Hartelius (2017) that, “Respect for
the careful methods of science does not mean surrender
to naïve materialism, or a physicalism that attempts to
explain all phenomena in the stark terms of physics” (p.
103). However, as the above quotes show, in practice such
a surrender does often occur.
Hartelius' Own Metaphysical Position
he above metaphysical statements from scientists
illustrate how difficult it is to eschew metaphysics,
and brings me back to the subject of Hartelius’ own
metaphysical position. When Hartelius has described
participatory philosophy as suggesting, for example,
that “consciousness in some form penetrates through
all physicality” (Hartelius, 2015, p. 26), I would argue
that this qualifies as a metaphysical statement. In fact,
I would argue that it does not differ greatly from the
description in Taylor (2016) of an all-pervading spiritual
force. Other aspects of participatory philosophy’s
view of the world, as described by Hartelius & Ferrer
(2015)—for example, as a dynamic open-ended system
with no duality between subject and object, and the
human mind and the natural world being of the same
nature—also probably qualify as metaphysical claims,
by Hartelius' own criteria. (Perhaps Hartelius would
suggest that these claims are not as substantively
metaphysical as soft perennialism, but this is debatable.)
This relates to my point about the inevitability
of holding some kind of interpretative metaphysical
position in relation to mystical experiences. This is
partly because mystical experiences often bring a
powerful sense of revelation, a sense that one has made
contact with a deeper level of reality, that necessitates
interpretation of some form. In other words, such
experiences inevitably give rise to questions about the
nature of reality. As Marshall (2015) has pointed out,
since one cannot escape some kind of metaphysical
perspective towards mystical experiences, it is surely
advisable to be explicit about this. Ferrer’s (2017)
insistence on the undetermined nature of the mystery
could be interpreted as a reluctance to disclose his
own metaphysics, due to his view that transpersonal
psychology should eschew metaphysics. In a similar
way, Hartelius' metaphysical position is unclear. While
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his broader metaphysical outlook appears to conform
to participatory philosophy, his attitude to mystical
experiences shows signs of neuroscientific reductionism
and contextualism (Marshall, 2015; Taylor, 2017a).
As stated in Taylor (2016, 2017a) my view is that
there is no reason why one should refrain from making
metaphysical claims, so long as these are secondary,
explicitly stated, and are inferred or implied by
phenomenological evidence, rather than being abstract
or conceptual. In fact, in some senses, this may actually
benefit the scientific enterprise, rather than hinder it. I
will illustrate this point with an example from quantum
physics.
Logical Positivism and Quantum Physics
In 1952, many of the world’s leading quantum physicists
met in Copenhagen, to discuss the construction of a
particle accelerator in Europe. There, an instructive
conversation took place between Werner Heisenberg,
Niels Bohr and Wolfgang Pauli, on the subject of
metaphysics. Bohr had recently given a talk about
quantum physics to a group of logical positivist
philosophers, an experience he described as a “terrible
disappointment” (Heisenberg, 1971, p. 208). Although
he endorsed the positivists’ emphasis on conceptual
clarity, he remarked that “Their prohibition of any
discussion of the wider issues, simply because we lack
clear-cut enough concepts in this realm, does not seem
very useful to me—this same ban would prevent you
understanding of quantum theory” (Heisenberg, 1971,
p. 208).
Heisenberg voiced similar misgivings,
commenting that:
Positivists are extraordinarily prickly about all
problems having what they call a prescientific
character. I remember a book by Philipp Frank on
causality, in which he dismisses a whole series of
problems and formulations on the grounds that all of
them are relics of the old metaphysics, vestiges from
the period of prescientific or animistic thought…To
him ‘metaphysic’ is a synonym for ‘loose thinking’
and hence a term of abuse (Heisenberg, 1971, p.
208).
Bohr had encountered Phillip Frank at this talk, and
described him as using “the term metaphysics as a kind
of swearword, or at best, as a euphemism for unscientific
thought” (Heisenberg, 1971, p. 209). (I think there are
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some similarities with Hartelius’ attitude to metaphysics
here.)
Later the same day, Heisenberg and Wolfgang
Pauli talked alone, and both agreed on the importance
of examining obscure metaphysical areas where language
and meaning were unclear. As Heisenberg remarked,
“Where must we seek for the truth, in obscenity or in
clarity? Niels has quoted Schiller's 'Truth dwells in the
deeps.' Are there such deeps and is there any truth? And
may these deeps perhaps hold the meaning of life and
death?” (Heisenberg, 1971, p. 211).
It is interesting that these three eminent
scientists believed that metaphysical ideas were an
important part of the scientific enterprise, and freely
explored them. More than sixty years ago, they were
opposed to distinctions of the kind that Hartelius (2017)
and also Friedman (2013) make between the unscientific
and scientific, and believed that such a distinction
would negate an understanding of quantum theory. In
fact, in Taylor (2017a) I have suggested that Hartelius'
(and Friedman’s) negative attitude to metaphysics is
reminiscent of (although admittedly not as extreme as)
logical positivist philosophy. I have also suggested that
such an attitude may deprive transpersonal psychology
of significant data—exactly as the three physicists above
believed in relation to science in general.
Why should one be limited to what is commonly
and immediately accessible to consciousness and
disregard certain experiences or concepts simply because
they are unfalsifiable? I do not think it is reasonable
to deny theorists the right of making metaphysical
speculations, as long as these are carefully justified, and
with more research proposed to test the hypothesis.
To consider what is beyond the falsifiable does
not mean that one immediately ceases to be a scientist.
There is no clearly demarcated point where scientists
suddenly become metaphysicians, simply because they
have allowed themselves to ponder over the ontological
implications of their findings. Surely science is not
simply a matter of examining and collecting data, but
also a matter of creating theories based on that data.
It would be difficult to argue that Heisenberg,
Pauli and Bohr were not valid scientists. This also applies
to the large number of psychologists who considered
metaphysical ideas, including William James, Jung, and
transpersonal psychologists such as Maslow, Assagioli
and Grof. According to Hartelius’ criteria (as applied to
myself, Wilber and Blackstone) it would be more accurate
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to view these figures as spiritual teachers (and the creators
of New Age religions) rather than psychologists.
Hierarchy
et me briefly respond to the criticism that Hartelius
(2017) has made of the allegedly hierarchical nature of
soft perennialism. This criticism was first raised by Ferrer
(2002) in connection with traditional perennialism.
This can be framed in terms of the distinction described
earlier between esoteric and exoteric religion. Rightly
in my view, Ferrer (2002) has suggested that Schuon
(1984) and other perennialists privilege the esoteric over
the exoteric, implying that the outward conventional
forms of religion are a pale shadow of the mystical core,
in which transcendent universals express themselves. Or,
as Hartelius (2017) has framed this point in relation to
soft perennialism, “One particular spiritual vision—
one out of the thousands that have been crafted—is the
correct account of all of human spirituality, and explains
all other versions as lesser or partially informed variants
of its own vision. In this way perennialism is necessarily
and intrinsically hierarchical—even soft perennialism”
(p. xv, italics in original).
However, although it is easy to see how this
criticism could apply to hard perennialists like Schuon
(1975) and Huxley (1945), in my view, it is less relevant
to soft perennialism, which allows for a great deal of
diversity, and does not privilege any particular spiritual
expression over any other. This is one of the ways in
which it resembles Ferrer’s (2002, 2017) participatory
philosophy. As noted in Taylor (2016), soft perennialism
sees (in Hick’s, 1989, terminology) indigenous preaxial and post-axial spiritual traditions as equally valid.
Soft perennialism allows for an immanent spirituality
that expresses itself with equal validity in many diverse
forms, none of which are higher or more valuable any
other.
Ferrer (2017) has made a similar criticism
in specific relation to the concept of an all-pervading
spiritual force. He has suggested that soft perennialism
privileges an essential spiritual force over metaphysical
depictions of that force, thus creating a hierarchical
framework. However, in my view, there is no reason why
an interpretation or conception of spirit-force that is more
laden with cultural and metaphysical constructs (such as
a Christian or Jewish mystic’s concept of God) should
be seen as less valuable than one that is apparently less
constructed (such as the Lakota concept of wakan-tanka
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or the Ainu of Japan’s concept of ramut). Here one could
make an analogy with food. Certain foods may be eaten
raw; in other meals, raw foods may be processed, cooked
and combined in different ways. This does not mean that
raw food is superior to cooked food. One could just as
easily switch the hegemony around and suggest that the
processed and cooked food is superior to the raw. Any
hierarchical interpretation here is surely in the eye of the
beholder.

Hartelius (2017) is right to caution against
“highly selective readings of empirical evidence” (p. 82)
and he is also right to distinguish between evidence for
an experience, and the interpretation of that experience.
But an interpretation can, of course, make a claim for
validity if it is based on evidence, and is supported by
multiple sources and studies—as I believe is the case
with the soft perennialism model, and essentialism in
general.

False Equivalence
erhaps the most controversial aspect of Hartelius'
(2017) response is the comparison of soft perennialism
to intelligent design, creationism, and a New Age religion.
In order to evaluate this argument further, let us return to
Hartelius' (2017) view that I have used a postmodernist
type of false equivalence to compare the metaphysics
of science to those of religion, since in practice science
is (according to Hartelius’ argument) less influenced
by metaphysical ideas and assumptions. I believe that
in comparing soft perennialism to intelligent design,
Hartelius (2017) may be indulging in a similar notion
of false equivalence. To claim that soft perennialism
is similar to intelligent design because both are partly
evidence-based, and both stem from an interpretation
of evidence, could also be taken as an example of the
application of the post-truth, postmodernist perspective.
There are obviously degrees and types of
evidence, as Hartelius has pointed out, in the same
way that there are degrees of metaphysical influence.
Creationism is based on the wilful misinterpretation and
fabrication of evidence, and to compare this to a theory
derived from empirical evidence from a wide variety of
sources and other scholars seems unjust. To compare soft
perennialism to creationism does not take account of the
various arguments for a perennial perspective made in
Taylor (2016) and (2017)—for example, from the various
studies using Hood’s M-Scale, studies into the aftereffects of near-death experiences, into the characteristics
of post-traumatic growth, the conclusions of scholars
such as Studshill (2005) and Rose (2016) based on their
examinations of spiritual texts and reports of mystical
experiences, evidence from my own research, and so
on. Soft perennialism is not based on ideology, myth
or tradition. Although provocative and speculative, it
is not fabricated, but to some extent empirically based,
and therefore not equivalent to creationism, or a new age
religion.

Conclusion
fully understand that Hartelius has developed his
own vision of transpersonal psychology that he is
encouraging others to adopt. However, I believe that
transpersonal psychology should be as inclusive as
possible, and be open to multiple perspectives. I do not see
why soft perennialism cannot coexist with Hartelius' own
perspective, and multiple other perspectives. (After all,
this pluralism is fully in accordance with the participatory
philosophy that Hartelius has advocated.) It is surely
healthy for such scholarly diversity to coexist within the
same field.
I also understand that Hartelius is keen to exclude
metaphysical claims from transpersonal psychology so
that the field may be taken more seriously by mainstream
psychologists and scientists. Perhaps this would be the
case, but one should be aware of the consequences of
this. By limiting itself in the way that Hartelius (2017)
and Friedman (2013) have recommended, transpersonal
psychology would surely be turning away from the farther
reaches of human nature, and disregarding a massive
amount of potentially interesting and important data
that lies there. Surely, as Heisenberg remarked above,
these obscure areas should be explored. As the mystical
scholar Evelyn Underhill (1932) wrote, “We may be
sure that vast regions of existence lie beyond our sensory
range; and that the world invisible includes grades and
kinds of being of which we are unable to conceive” (p. 6).
This recalls William James’ (1986) famous comment—
from which I have adapted the title of this essay—that
“our normal waking consciousness…is but one special
type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from
it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of
consciousness entirely different…No account of the
universe in its totality can be final which leaves these
other forms of consciousness quite disregarded” (p. 388).
I would suggest that a form of transpersonal
psychology that includes metaphysical speculations (as
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long as they are inferred by evidence and are not seen
as central, and are explicitly stated) and that is open to
perennial perspectives could fit very well within the
context of the scientifically oriented, empirically-based
form of transpersonal psychology that Hartelius has
envisaged—and indeed, that it will actually enhance and
extend the field in its diversity.
Much to his credit, Hartelius (2017) encouraged
further debate into these issues, and I look forward to
responses from other transpersonal psychologists.
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